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ABSTRACT
Over the last few years, there has been substantial research on
automated analysis, testing, and debugging of Ethereum smart
contracts. However, it is not trivial to compare and reproduce that
research. To address this, we present SmartBugs, an extensible and
easy-to-use execution framework that simplifies the execution of
analysis tools on smart contracts written in Solidity, the primary
language used in Ethereum. SmartBugs is currently distributed
with support for 10 tools and two datasets of Solidity contracts.
The first dataset can be used to evaluate the precision of analysis
tools, as it contains 143 annotated vulnerable contracts with 208
tagged vulnerabilities. The second dataset contains 47,518 unique
contracts collected through Etherscan. We discuss how SmartBugs
supported the largest experimental setup to date both in the number
of tools and in execution time. Moreover, we show how it enables
easy integration and comparison of analysis tools by presenting a
new extension to the tool SmartCheck that improves substantially
the detection of vulnerabilities related to the DASP10 categories
Bad Randomness, Time Manipulation, and Access Control (identified
vulnerabilities increased from 11% to 24%).
CCS CONCEPTS
• Software and its engineering → Software testing and de-
bugging; Software defect analysis; • Security and privacy→
Software security engineering.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Ethereum is one of the most popular blockchain-based platforms,
mainly because it enables developers to write distributed applica-
tions (Dapps) based on smart contracts— programs that are exe-
cuted across a decentralised network of nodes. The main language
used to develop Ethereum smart contracts is Solidity1, a high-level
language that follows a JavaScript-like, object-oriented paradigm.
Contracts written in Solidity are compiled to bytecode that can be
executed on the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM).
Smart contracts are at the core of Ethereum’s value. However,
as noted by some researchers [1, 5], writing secure smart contracts
is far from trivial. In a preliminary study performed on nearly one
million Ethereum smart contracts, using one analysis framework for
verifying correctness, 34,200 of them were flagged as vulnerable [6].
Famous attacks, such as TheDAO exploit2 and the Parity wallet
bug3 illustrate this problem and have led to huge financial losses.
There has been some effort from the research community to
develop automated analysis tools that locate and eliminate vulner-
abilities in smart contracts [4, 5, 8, 9]. However, it is not easy to
compare and reproduce that research: even though several of the
tools are publicly available, the datasets used are not. If a developer
of a new tool wants to compare the new tool with existing work,
the current approach is to contact the authors of alternative tools
and hope that they give access to their datasets (as done in, e.g., [7]).
The aim of this paper is to present SmartBugs, an extensible
and easy-to-use execution framework that simplifies the execution
of analysis tools on Solidity smart contracts and facilitates repro-
ducibility. We describe the architecture of the framework, the tools
and datasets provided, and the methodologies used for adding new
tools and for filtering datasets (§2). We illustrate two typical use
cases where SmartBugs can be used (§3). First, we discuss how it
supported the largest experimental setup to date both in the number
of tools and in execution time [3]. Second, we show how it can be
used to compare tools by adding a new extension of SmartCheck [8]
that improves substantially the detection of vulnerabilities related
to the DASP10 categories Bad Randomness, Time Manipulation, and
Access Control (identified vulnerabilities increased from 11% to 24%).
SmartBugs is open-source and is publicly available online at:
https://smartbugs.github.io
1Interested readers on Solidity, refer to https://solidity.readthedocs.io.
2Analysis of the DAO exploit (Phil Daian): https://bit.ly/2XOqVmy
3The $280M EthereumâĂŹs Parity bug (Matt Suiche): https://bit.ly/3guX8Yx
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Figure 1: SmartBugs Architecture
2 SMARTBUGS
This section describes SmartBugs, focusing on system requirements,
available tools and datasets, methodologies for adding tools and fil-
tering datasets, and the available interfaces. SmartBugs is composed
of five main parts: the command-line interface, the tool configura-
tions, the Docker images of the tools, the datasets of smart contracts,
and the SmartBugs Runner, which brings all the parts together to ex-
ecute the analysis tools. We also provide a web-based user interface
that interacts with SmartBugs. Figure 1 shows how the different
SmartBugs components are put together.
2.1 System Requirements
SmartBugs requires Docker and Python3 with the modules PyYAML,
solidity_parser, and docker. Since Solidity versions are not always
backwards-compatible, the analysis tools might have problems
processing some contracts depending on the solidity compiler used.
For example, Solidity v0.5.0 introduced breaking changes4 and this
creates compatibility issues with some versions of the Mythril tool.
To mitigate this problem, SmartBugs provides the possibility of
having two different versions of the same tool by adding a property
in the configuration file. The configuration file supports a default
tool version to compile and analyse contracts above Solidity v0.5.0
(or all contracts if no other tool version is provided). It is also
possible to specify a different tool version to compile and analyse
contracts below Solidity v0.5.0. This is illustrated in Section 2.3.
2.2 Available Tools and Datasets
At the time of writing, SmartBugs comes with 10 tools ready to
be used: HoneyBadger, Maian, Manticore, Mythril, Osiris, Oyente,
Securify, Slither, SmartCheck, Solhint. It is also distributed with two
datasets of Solidity contracts. The first dataset is named sbcurated
and contains 143 annotated vulnerable contracts with 208 tagged
vulnerabilities, divided into 10 categories. This dataset can be used
to evaluate the precision of analysis tools. The second dataset is
named sbwild and it contains 47,518 unique5 contracts collected
through Etherscan. All contracts and tools are publicly available.
The collection methodology for sbcurated is explained in this sec-
tion. For details about sbwild, we refer the reader to [3].
Our objective in constructing sbcurated is to provide a reliable
dataset with a collection of vulnerabilities designed to be repro-
ducible, that follows a known taxonomy and that can serve as a
reference dataset to the research community. The dataset follows
4Solidity v0.5.0 introduced breaking changes: https://bit.ly/2W0bY0x
5We consider two contracts to be duplicates when their MD5 checksum is the same
after removing all the spaces and tabulations.
Table 1: Categories of vulnerabilities available in the
dataset sbcurated. LoC computed using cloc 1.82.
Category Contracts Vulns LoC
Access Control 17 19 899
Arithmetic 14 24 304
Bad Randomness 8 30 1,079
Denial of service 6 7 177
Front running 4 7 137
Reentrancy 31 32 2,164
Short addresses 1 1 18
Time manipulation 5 7 100
Unchecked low level calls 53 78 4055
Other 3 3 115
Total 143 208 9,048
the taxonomy of DASP 10.6 Since the category Unknown Unknowns
represents future and undiscovered vulnerabilities, we opted to
map vulnerabilities that did not fit any other of the nine categories
into this category (e.g. vulnerabilities such as uninitialized data and
the possibility of locking down Ether). For simplicity, we use the
nomenclature Other instead of Unknown Unknowns.
sbcurated was created by collecting smart contracts from three
different sources: GitHub repositories, Blog posts that analyse con-
tracts and the Ethereum network. Most of contracts were collected
from GitHub repositories and the Ethereum network. We ensure
the traceability of each contract by providing the URL from which
they were taken and its author, where possible. Table 1 shows
how the 143 contracts are categorized. Each row contains a cate-
gory of vulnerability. For each category, we provide the number of
contracts available within that category and the total number of
vulnerabilities and number of lines of code of the contracts of that
category.
2.3 Methodology for Adding Tools
Addition of tools in SmartBugs is designed to be simple and practi-
cal, allowing the user to control the execution of the tools according
to their needs. Currently, all the tools in SmartBugs use Docker im-
ages pulled from Docker Hub. We use pre-existing Docker images
when available; otherwise, we create our own image (all Docker
images are made publicly available on Docker Hub). The choice to
use Docker images was made to ease the addition of tools, allow
the execution to be reproducible and use the same execution envi-
ronment for all tools, allowing the user to execute SmartBugs in
any environment where Python3 and Docker are installed.
Each tool plugin contains the configuration of the tool. The con-
figuration contains the name of the Docker image, the name of the
tool, the command to run the tool, and, optionally, the description
of the tool and the location of the output of results. Once a Docker
image providing the tool is available, adding the tool to SmartBugs
consists of adding a new configuration file (an .YAML file) such as
the following:
docker_image:
default: qspprotocol/securify-usolc
solc<5: qspprotocol/securify-0.4.25
cmd: --livestatusfile /results/output.json -fs
6DASP 10 taxonomy: https://dasp.co
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output_in_files:
folder: /results/output.json
By default, SmartBugs extracts the results from the output printed
by each tool. If instead a tool stores the result of the analysis in a
file in the Docker image, the path of that file should be defined in
the configuration file using the optional configuration parameter
output_in_files, as shown above.
Finally, when adding a tool to SmartBugs, a parse method can
be implemented so that the output with the vulnerabilities detected
by the tool is normalized.7
2.4 Methodology for Filtering Datasets
SmartBugs supports the definition of named datasets, which rep-
resent subsets of contracts that share a common property. For ex-
ample, a named dataset already provided by default is reentrancy:
it corresponds to contracts that are identified as being vulnera-
ble to reentrancy attacks. Named datasets can be specified in a
configuration file (config/dataset/dataset.yaml). To add a custom
named dataset, the user simply has to alter the configuration file
by adding a name and the correspondent list of paths. The path can
be a directory, a file, or a list of both. For example:
reentrancy: dataset/reentrancy
arithmetic:
- dataset/arithmetic
- dataset/reentrancy/reentrance.sol
2.5 Command-Line Interface
SmartBugs provides a command line interface that allows users to
run different analysis tools on the available datasets of contracts.
The user can also get information about the tools, if provided,
skip an execution that already has results, specify the number of
processes to use during the analysis (by default 1) and list the named
datasets and tools available. SmartBugs command-line interface
can be invoked as:
smartBugs.py [-h, --help]
(--file FILES | --dataset DATASETS)
--tool TOOLS --info TOOLS
--skip-existing --processes PROCESSES
--list {tools, datasets}
Usage Example To run the tools Oyente and Mythril against the
contracts in the named dataset reentrancy, we can execute:
smartBugs.py --tool oyente mythril --dataset reentrancy
This command creates an output folder with the results of the
analysis for each tool executed. By inspecting the output files, we
can determine very quickly which contracts are identified as having
vulnerabilities. Since all the tools added to SmartBugs come with
a parser mechanism to normalize the output, a json file, with all
vulnerabilities detected by the tool is created. A file containing
the raw output of the tool executed is also generated in the same
folder. Also, the SmartBugs logs are stored in a folder called logs
composed of files named with the date and hour of the execution.
7For example, the parser for SmartCheck is defined here: https://bit.ly/3exxeRW.
Figure 2: SmartBugs Web Dashboard
2.6 WUI Dashboard
We also provide a Web-based UI (WUI) that interacts with Smart-
Bugs.8 This dashboard provides the user easy access to the list
of tools, named datasets available and the vulnerabilities detected
by each tool available mapped to a category of DASP 10. Figure 2
shows a screenshot of the dashboard. It offers three options to
analyse smart contracts: (1) The user can paste or write a smart
contract directly in the browser; (2) The user can import a smart
contract by uploading a file; (3) The user can run the available
tools on pre-defined datasets (from sbcurated). After execution, the
dashboard shows a graph with the number of security issues found
by each tool, and for each tool it presents the issues found.
3 USE CASES
The primary envisaged users of SmartBugs are researchers who
are interested in automated analysis and debugging of Solidity
smart contracts. In this section, we present two typical use cases.
First, we summarize an empirical evaluation that was supported
by SmartBugs [3]. We then show how SmartBugs can support tool
developers by discussing how a new extension of SmartCheck [8]
can be easily compared with the original tool.
3.1 Supporting Empirical Evaluations
SmartBugs can support researchers who are interested in doing
large empirical evaluations. The command-line interface and the
options --skip-existing and --processes are particularly help-
ful. We have recently used SmartBugs to obtain an overview of
the current status of automated analysis tools for Solidity smart
contracts and to support the largest experimental setup to date
both in the number of tools and in execution time [3]. We eval-
uated 10 state-of-the-art automated analysis tools on sbwild and
on a subset of sbcurated that contained 69 contracts (since then,
the number of contracts in sbcurated has increased). In total, we
ran 428,337 analyses that took approximately 564 days and 3 hours.
We found that only 42% of the vulnerabilities from the annotated
dataset are detected by all the tools, with the tool Mythril having
the higher accuracy (27%). When considering the largest dataset,
sbwild, we observed that 97% of contracts are tagged as vulnerable,
thus suggesting a considerable number of false positives.
The use of SmartBugs made the task easier and was crucial to
ensure that the work can be completely reproduced.
8SmartBugs Dashboard: https://github.com/smartbugs/smartbugs-dashboard
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3.2 Supporting Developers of Analysis Tools
The empirical evaluation described above showed that there is room
for improvement for automated analysis tools to detect more vul-
nerabilities. For example, Bad Randomness was one of the categories
that all of the tools failed to detect. In this section, we describe a
simple extension of the tool SmartCheck [8] that enables the de-
tection of vulnerabilities related to Bad Randomness and improves
detection of Time Manipulation and Access Control vulnerabilities.9
We refer to our extension as SmartCheck Extended.
SmartCheck runs lexical and syntactical analysis on Solidity
source code. It uses a custom Solidity grammar to generate an
XML parse tree as an intermediate representation (IR). SmartCheck
detects vulnerability patterns by using XPath patterns on the IR.
Our approach to improve SmartCheck vulnerabilities detection was
to add new rules, in the form of XPath patterns.
We added three new rules to SmartCheck. The first rule is named
SOLIDITY_BAD_RANDOMNESS and aims at detecting issues re-
lated to the category Bad Randomness. For this, we created an
XPath pattern to detect the use of environment variables such as
block.number, block.coinbase, block.difficulty, block.gaslimit, block-
hash, and block.blockhash. For the second rule, we followed a simi-
lar approach to update the rule SOLIDITY_EXACT_TIME, already
included in SmartCheck. We modified the pattern to look for expres-
sions that contain block.timestamp or now, extending the previously
defined rule for cases more general than comparisons. These rules
are straightforward lexical analyses whose goal is to simply detect
the use of the referred environment variables and to flag their use,
acting as a warning.
Regarding Access Control, SmartCheck’s default rule is restricted
to tx.origin issues. To improve this, we added a pattern to search for
‘suicides’ (uses of selfdestruct) and ownership transfers where the
functionmisses proper protection.We constructed two rule patterns
inside a single rule named SOLIDITY_UNPROTECTED. To detect
unprotected issues we created a pattern to look for all functions
defined, excluding constructors, that do not have standardmodifiers
defined, as onlyOwner, or require statements protecting a value
assignment to a variable defined as owner or selfdestruct calls.
The source code of SmartCheck Extended is available onGitHub10
as a fork of the original SmartCheck. It is also included in SmartBugs
and ready to executed.
3.2.1 Results. We used SmartBugs to compare our extension with
the original tool. Table 2 compares the results obtained for SmartCheck
in the empirical evaluation described in Subsection 3.1 with the
results obtained from executing our extension on the same dataset
of contracts. The results shown in the table only consider the 69
contracts used in the empirical study mentioned above [3], so that
we can perform a fair comparison. We can observe that SmartCheck
Extended is capable of detecting a total of 15 more issues, more than
doubling the capability of detection when compared to SmartCheck.
With our proposed extension we can detect 24% of the vulnerabil-
ities annotated in sbcurated, instead of the previous 11%. More
details about this extension, including evaluation on its precision,
are presented in [2].
9Descriptions of these vulnerabilities can be found in DASP’s website: https://dasp.co
10SmartCheck Extended: https://github.com/pedrocrvz/smartcheck
Table 2: Vulnerabilities identified per category by
SmartCheck and SmartCheck Extended in sbcurated
Category SmartCheck SmartCheck Extended
Access Control 2/19 11% 4/19 21%
Arithmetic 1/22 5% 1/22 5%
Bad Randomness 0/31 5% 10/31 32%
Denial of Service 0/7 0% 0/7 0%
Front Running 0/7 0% 0/7 0%
Reentrancy 5/8 62% 5/8 62%
Short Addresses 0/1 0% 0/1 0%
Time Manipulation 1/5 20% 4/ 5 80%
Unchecked Low Level Calls 4/12 33% 4/12 33%
Other 0/3 0% 0/3 0%
Total 13/115 11% . 28/115 24%
4 CONCLUSION
This paper presents SmartBugs, an extensible and easy-to-use ex-
ecution framework that simplifies the execution of analysis tools
on Solidity smart contracts. One of the main goals of SmartBugs is
to facilitate the reproducibility of research in automated reasoning
and testing of smart contracts. To demonstrate that integration of
new tools and comparison with existing tools is easy, we extended
SmartCheck and used SmartBugs to show that our extended version
improves substantially the detection of vulnerabilities related to
Bad Randomness, Time Manipulation, and Access Control.
We believe that SmartBugs can be a valuable asset for driving
research in automated analysis of smart contracts. Future work in-
cludes i) addition of new analysis tools, ii) expansion of the datasets
with more contracts, iii) improved documentation (e.g. contribution
guidelines), and iv) new empirical studies supported by SmartBugs.
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